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Abstract 
In this paper the interaction between financial reporting and management control systems is analyzed, with special focus 
on the development of both disclosure and design of the compensation of the members of the management board. We find 
that despite some deficits of the National Code of Corporate Governance and deficits in its adoption its principles are 
functional for management control systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Regulations for companies concerning the design of remuneration systems of their management boards 
have considerably increased in scope during the last years. This development is founded upon trends to 
improve corporate governance. Especially for Austria, regulations are to be found both on a national and 
supranational level. The most concrete requirements for Austrian corporations result from the Austrian Code 
of Corporate Governance (OeCGK) which must be applied by listed companies. 
Remuneration systems are of special interest to regulations on corporate governance as they are at the core 
of the principal-agent-problem. The design of these remuneration systems directly affects management’s aims 
and behavior, as it sets direct targets for their performance. It is most likely that these individual targets will 
also directly affect the overall target system of corporations as run by management. Because of this, research 
recently turned towards examining the close link between remuneration systems and performance 
measurement systems within corporations (Dossi et al., 2010). As remuneration systems are becoming 
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increasingly regulated and subject to more severe requirements concerning design and especially disclosure of 
these designs, a close interrelationship between reporting requirements and management control systems 
results: internal control mechanisms become part of the companies` disclosures to external parties, and 
subsequently those reporting requirements induce changes in the underlying management control systems 
because of the increased accountability. The focus of this interrelationship lies in maximizing corporate value 
for shareholders. However, the question is to what extent these attempts at establishing mechanisms for 
“good” corporate governance are effective (i.e. induce changes in the way corporate performance systems are 
adjusted to this aim of a sustainable increase in corporate value). 
Our study thus intends to give further insights by focusing on the disclosures made by Austrian 
corporations concerning the design of remuneration systems of their management boards. By analyzing a 
period of five years (2006-2010), we examine the changes in those disclosures based on the amendments to 
the regulations of the OeCGK during that period. This is combined with an examination of the changes made 
in the underlying designs of incentive systems as disclosed by the corporations. We look at companies listed 
in the Austrian Traded Index (ATX) which comprises the 20 largest companies listed on the Vienna Stock 
Exchange as per August 1st, 2011. For our study only compensations for the respective top-management 
teams are relevant. Given the minor practical importance of compensation based on stock-options (e.g. Rapp 
and Wolff, 2011), these are not included in the subsequent analysis given their assumed lower incentive 
effect. Thus we consider short term bonus payments which make up a substantial part of management 
remuneration (as the following analysis shows) and for which consequently also strict requirements 
concerning their design should apply. 
Chapter 2 illustrates the usefulness of reporting requirements for management control systems based on the 
relevant legal regulations concerning corporate governance for Austrian listed companies and vice versa. 
Then chapter 3 shows the results of our analysis concerning (i) the disclosure of management compensation 
on an individual or cumulative basis, (ii) the disclosure and relevance of variable compensation elements in 
total compensation, and (iii) the relevant performance measures to which these variable elements are linked. 
Chapter 4 summarizes the results of our research and identifies areas of further development for the corporate 
governance regulation. 
2. Interrelationship between Reporting Requirements and Management Control Systems 
By their regulatory function corporate governance codes go farther than other legal regulations and aim at 
establishing a code of conduct to ensure “good” corporate management. Explicit focus rests on the protection 
of the interests of existing and potential shareholders (von Werder, 2010, rec. 83). The OeCGK distinguishes 
two different types of regulations concerning remuneration systems for the management board: first, concrete 
requirements concerning the design of the compensation; second, reporting requirements concerning the 
amount and components of this remuneration. This information is directly addressed to the shareholders and 
thus tackles the central issue of the principal-agent-problem. 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the standard-setter aims at minimizing welfare losses and distribution 
disequilibrium which result from opportunistic actions by the agents (von Werder, 2009, p. 14). Shareholders 
benefit from adequate capital returns for their investments. The more the quality of national regulations on 
corporate governance increases, the lower the agency costs for these shareholders are, as they can reduce their 
own monitoring activities (given constant quality of the level of monitoring) (Beiner, 2005; Bassen and 
Zöllner, 2009, pp. 46-47). Shareholder value further increases because (i) shareholders are consequently 
willing to assess future cash flows more optimistically and (ii) risk premiums included in the costs of capitals 
are reduced (Beiner et al., 2004, p. 5). 
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Thus the reporting requirements imposed by the OeCGK promote the designing of remuneration systems 
that are functional to the main objective of management control systems. Its main focus lies on increasing 
shareholder value (just refer to Rappaport, 1998). This materializes e.g. in the requirements of including 
variable components of remunerations, basing them on both financial and non-financial performance 
measures and finally choosing those measures in accordance with long-term value-creation for shareholders. 
In a meta-study comparing 120 empirical surveys on the impact of value-based management, Lueg and 
Schäffer (2010) show the positive impact of this value-orientation in corporate governance on actual corporate 
value. 
Such a design of remuneration systems directly promotes the alignment of interests of both management 
and shareholders. Reporting on the design of these remuneration systems reduces information asymmetry: it 
informs share-holders in how far this alignment of interest is actually realized through the relevant 
remuneration system (Ringleb, 2010, rec. 777). Consequently, also the reporting requirements indirectly 
promote the alignment of interest. Thus, frequently literature refers to these reporting requirements as a 
“signal of integrity” (Baums, 2005, pp. 7-8) towards shareholders or as a “marketing instrument” (Evers, 
2009, p. 384). Most notably, not goods or services but internal management control structures form the core 
of these marketing activities. In this context German-speaking literature stresses the importance also of the 
disclosure of individual remuneration designs for the management board’s members. This is given priority 
over personal rights or data protection issues (Evers, 2009, p. 384). 
3. Remuneration Policy in the ATX-listed Companies 
3.1. Sample of the Subsequent Analysis 
The subsequent analysis is based on the annual reports including the corporate governance statements of 
the companies listed in the Austrian Traded Index (ATX) on the Vienna Stock Exchange on August 1st, 2011 
[b]. The investigation period lasts from the year 2006 to the year 2010. We have considered the reports for the 
calendar years 2006-2010 or – when the financial year deviated from the calendar year – the reports for years 
ending in the investigation period. 
3.2. Disclosure of the Management Remuneration 
Table 1 gives a first impression about the behavior of the companies concerning the disclosure of the 
management remuneration. This table shows on the one hand if the ATX-listed companies disclose the 
remuneration of the management board and on the other hand if they report the remuneration of each member 
of the board of directors (“individually”) or only the remuneration (of the board of directors) in total 
(“cumulative”). 
Table 1: Disclosure of the management remuneration 
Financial year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
"individually" in total 6 8 8 10 12
"cumulative" in total 10 9 9 9 7
"not specified" in total 4 3 3 1 1  
 
 
b. The annual reports of companies included in the analysis can be obtained online at 
http://www.wienerborse.at/investors/listedcompanies/. 
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As a result nearly every company discloses the remuneration in total and most of them also the 
compensation separately for each member. In the first year of the investigation period 85 percent covered the 
remuneration in total, while in the last year of the investigation period this was the case for all companies 
except one, or 95 percent. The number of companies that reported the individual compensation also increased 
from 2006 to 2010. For the financial year 2006, 30 percent covered the individual compensation of the 
managers; twice as many for the financial year 2010, or 60 percent. 
One reason for these results is certainly the amendment of the OeCGK in the year 2009. Since January 
2009 the rule number 31 of the Code which prescribes to report the remuneration of the board of directors 
separately for each member was reclassified from the category of R-Rules (“recommended”) into the category 
of C-Rules (“comply-or-explain”), so that any deviation from this rule must be explained and the reasons 
stated in order to be in compliance with the Code. Nevertheless a substantial part of the ATX-listed 
companies does not report the individual compensation. The companies which do not cover these data 
mention as reasons in their annual accounts and corporate governance statements: The protection of the 
privacy of the board members (four times), the low value of this information for the shareholders (three times) 
and the danger of possible misinterpretations (once) [c]. In literature such arguments are viewed critically (e.g. 
Evers, 2009, p. 384) and/or disproved (e.g. Baums, 2005, p. 8 with further references). 
3.3. Variable Components Related to Fixed Components 
After considering the behavior of the companies concerning the disclosure of the management 
remuneration we analyzed as next step the components of the reported total remuneration of the management 
board. We wanted to find out (i) if the compensation contains a variable component and (ii) the relevance of 
the variable part as measured by the relation between the variable component and the fixed component. Basis 
for this analysis were the principles of the management remuneration in total regardless of the individual 
compensation of the managers. So there was no need to exclude a company out of the sample because of 
missing information. Only considering one company (Schoeller-Bleckmann AG) we had to fall back on 
verbal information given in the financial report. 
For the analysis of the cumulative management remuneration table 2 shows the relation between variable 
components related to fixed components, as far as the corporate governance statements and/or the notes to the 
consolidated accounts contained these information in absolute figures. If the companies didn’t report about 
the remuneration and/or the amount of the variable and fixed part, the missing information is marked with 
“not specified” in table 2. 
Concerning the data the analysis is based on the following assumptions: If the disclosed remuneration 
contains benefits in kind, these benefits in kind are treated as part of the fixed component. Expenses for 
severance payments and pensions as well as share-based payments were generally excluded, if possible. With 
respect to the time reference of the remuneration we tried to refer the variable component to the year to which 
the underlying performance of the manager was related to – regardless the date of payment. This assignment 
required some adjustments (if the expenditure for the payment was made in the year after the year to which 
the underlying performance of the manager was related to) but was uncomplicated for most of the cases. If the 
reports didn’t allow any conclusion concerning the time reference of the remuneration we didn’t make any 
adjustments. As a result of the time-based adjustments deviations between the disclosed amount of the 
variable part of the remuneration and the number of disclosures of the remuneration arise for the same year.  
 
 
c. Schoeller Bleckmann AG exercises the liberating option stated in sections 241 (4) and 266 d7 of the Austrian Company Law, 
however does not give further explanation on its reasons. 
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Table 2: Variable components related to fixed components 
Financial year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Disclosure                              
of the variable component 13 14 15 17 17
Mean 1,290 1,177 0,783 0,839 0,892
Standard deviation 0,576 0,518 0,724 0,560 0,485
Median 1,293 1,263 0,640 0,824 0,847
Minimum 0,333 0,333 0,000 0,000 0,282
Maximum 2,361 2,141 2,078 2,114 2,080
Spread 2,028 1,808 2,078 2,114 1,798  
Throughout the entire investigation period the majority of the companies in the sample disclosed the 
principles of the remuneration system including the amount of the variable component. The number of 
companies which reported the variable component of the compensation increased in the course of the 
investigation period; in the financial year 2006 this was the case for 65 percent of the sample up to 85 percent 
for the year 2010. Taking the verbal information in the reports into account the percentage increases by up to 
5 percent for the financial years 2009 and 2010. In these periods Schoeller-Bleckmann AG discloses the 
average variable part of the management remuneration for the first time [d]. These statements could not be 
taken into account in table 2 because they were not specific enough. None of the companies which do not 
disclose the variable component of the management compensation give an explanation for doing so. 
In the course of the investigation period we notice a slight variation with regard to the variable component, 
but throughout the entire period the management remuneration consists in most cases of a high part of 
variable performance-linked component. So the mean of the variable component amounts to around 130 
percent of the fixed component in the year 2006 and to approximately 90 percent in the year 2010. The 
maximum – referring to one company – is about 230 percent for the financial year 2006. Noticeable is the 
minimum of the variable part in the amount of zero for the financial years 2008 (for 25 percent of the 
companies) and 2009 (for 15 percent of the companies) which has its reason probably in the financial crisis. 
This explanation for the missing variable component can also be found in the annual reports of the 
corresponding firms. 
Finally we recognize a high volatility of the variable part of the compensation during the whole 
investigation period. The variation of the variable part continues to be high towards the end of investigation 
period in spite of some restrictions admitted to the OeCGK concerning this matter. As example for such a 
restriction serves the provision that the measurable performance criteria shall be fixed in advance as well as 
maximum limits for amounts or as percentage of the fixed component for the measurable performance 
criteria. This C-Rule was introduced in January 2010. 
Table 3 shows the reported maximum limits of the variable components of the management remuneration 
as percentage of the fixed components. With regard to the time reference the assumptions made for table 2 
apply analogously for table 3. If a company uses a graduated system with several limits, only the highest one 
is shown in the table. 
Table 3: Maximum limit of variable components related to fixed components 
 
 
d. According to the information given for 2009 “the average variable portion in the total compensation of the Executive Board was 
37 % in the last years” (Schoeller-Bleckmann AG, annual report 2009, p. 34), which equals roughly 0,587 in relation to fixed 
components; for 2010, “the average variable portion in the total compensation of the Executive Board was 48% in the last years.” 
(Schoeller-Bleckmann AG, annual report 2010, p. 41) which equals roughly 0,923 in relation to fixed components. 
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Financial year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Disclosure                           
of the maximum limit 4 6 7 11 14
Mean 126,8% 173,3% 154,4% 148,6% 166,9%
Minimum 90,0% 90,0% 90,0% 50,0% 66,0%
Maximum 200,0% 300,0% 300,0% 300,0% 300,0%  
We conclude that the disclosure of the maximum limits is less common than the disclosure of the variable 
parts of the management compensation. The number of companies which reports the maximum limits 
increased from 20 percent in the first year of the investigation period up to 70 percent in the last year of the 
investigation period. Considering the companies which report about the application of maximum limits, but 
without any specification of the limits, the part of the disclosures rises by 5 percentage points for the years 
2006 to 2008 and by 10 percentage points for the years 2009 and 2010. A significant improvement in 
reporting can be noticed for the years 2009 and 2010. By contrast to the rules concerning the reporting of the 
variable components the provision to cover the maximum limits for amounts or as percentage of the fixed 
component has only been existing for the financial year 2010 in the OeCGK. This could be a reason for the 
observations described above. The question if the companies which do not cover maximum limits do not have 
implemented such limits cannot be answered. Specific explanations why they do not report about (non-
existent) maximum limits also were missing in the company statements. 
The disclosed maximum limits give an impression about possible extensions of the variable part of the 
management compensation. The maximum limits offer a wide range for variable components – beginning 
from 50 percent up to 300 percent related to the fixed component. This verifies the high variation and the 
relevance of the variable component. The amount of the maximum limits varies during the investigation 
period in every direction. At least a quarter of the companies modified the reported limits in the investigation 
period. Furthermore the system of maximum limits was changed by the implementation or modification of 
graduated limits. Because of the immense increase in disclosure the variation of the mean during the 
investigation period is not significant. Nevertheless the variable component is regularly limited by the amount 
of the fixed component or a higher multiple of the fixed component up to 300 percent. 
Overall the observations of table 2 and table 3 – inter alia, the wide range and the high variation of the 
variable component as well as the irregularities in the financial years 2008 and 2009 – indicate a consideration 
of the principle-agent-problem in the arrangement of the remuneration system. Certainly these developments 
were promoted by the application of the OeCGK. The disclosure of the remuneration system also indicates a 
reduction of information asymmetry. 
3.4. Assessment Basis of the Variable Component 
As significant for the quality of the implemented incentive system is the assessment basis of the variable 
component. For our study we formed four different clusters of assessment bases to specify the method to 
calculate the variable component of the management compensation. We defined one cluster for traditional 
accounting-based performance measures (Cluster I), a second cluster for traditional cost-accounting based 
compensations (Cluster II) and a third cluster with value-based compensations (Cluster III). The fourth cluster 
consists of non-financial criteria (Cluster IV) which only were used in addition to financial criteria. If a 
company applies more than one criterion to calculate the variable component it is assigned to every relevant 
cluster. 
Opposite to the procedure in tables 2 and 3 concerning the time reference the disclosed assessment basis 
were referred to the year of company reporting. The reason for this procedure is the assumed lower 
interrelation between the periodization of the management compensation and the disclosure of the under-lying 
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assessment bases. Only for Verbund AG we made an adjustment because the company reporting included an 
explicit statement concerning the time reference.  
Corresponding to the observation described above the number of companies which cover the assessment 
basis of the variable component represent the higher part of the sample and increases during the investigation 
period beginning with 65 percent for the year 2006 up to 95 percent for the year 2010. Table 4 also shows – 
considering the partly existing lack of disclosure – that traditional accounting-based figures are still more 
common to measure the performance of the management than value-based performance indicators. This 
statement is valid for the whole investigation period. Thereby the figures annual net profit, EBIT and 
EBITDA as well as various cash-flow-based figures are of particular importance [e]. 
Table 4: Assessment basis of the variable component 
Financial year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Disclosure                           
of the assessment basis 13 15 17 19 19
Cluster I                   
(financial accounting-based) 13 14 16 17 16
Cluster II                         
(cost accounting-based) 0 1 1 1 1
Cluster III                       
(value-based) 6 5 6 6 6
Cluster IV                             
(non-financial criteria) 5 6 7 9 8  
The application of value-based performance measures would not only reduce the principle-agent-problem, 
it would also be accompanied by an approach to the OeCGK. Already in the first version of the Code 
published in the year 2002 the variable component of the management compensation should be linked to long-
term performance criteria (C-Rule 27). After a revision of the Code in January 2009 the variable component 
should also be based on sustainable performance criteria; since the revision in January 2010 the variable 
component shall be calculated on sustainable, long-term and multi-year performance criteria and also include 
non-financial criteria. With regard to these developments some companies mention in their annual reports for 
the years 2010 planned modifications in their remuneration systems [f]. Therefore further improvements can 
be expected for the following years. 
In the course of the investigation period we noticed that the most important change relates to the increasing 
relevance of non-financial criteria as one element of the assessment basis. All the other modifications based 
on first-time disclosures. Finally we realized that the total number of companies which applied value-based 
performance measures did not vary during the investigation period, but the specific companies which applied 
value-based performance measures changed. 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
At the end of our analysis we like to stress two findings which surfaced during our proceedings. Firstly, we 
find considerable differences between the analyzed corporations regarding the concrete forms of disclosure. 
Even corporations that fully comply to the regulations of the OeCGK show vast differences concerning 
 
 
e. The decrease in 2010 for the clusters I and IV is due to not-yet available information by one listed company for that year 
(previously employing assessment bases from these two clusters). 
f. Explicitly eight annual reports include such statements. 
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clearness and depth of information given to its shareholders. For example: some corporations only give rough 
statements on the applied performance measures which serve as bases for their remuneration systems, e.g. that 
these measures “are dependent on the achievement of specific earnings and profit figures calculated according 
to principles of cost accounting” [g]. Others state the concrete measures and how these measures are weighted 
accordingly [ h ]. The resulting limitations concerning the comparability of these disclosures reduce the 
informational value for both existing and potential shareholders. 
Secondly, sustainability of installed remuneration systems in the sense of maintaining continuity of these 
systems and avoiding too-frequent changes in their design does not seem to have been granted throughout the 
vast majority of examined corporations. As far as this is transparent, based on disclosures made, most 
companies changed their employed designs of remuneration systems at least once (many of them even 
considerably more often) during the investigation period. It is likely that these changes result mainly from 
exogenous factors: the financial crisis and the changes in the corporations’ business environments resulting 
from the crisis. Subsequently also the improvements made to the OeCGK due to the crisis induced many of 
these changes. However despite these explanations the frequent changes in the designs of remuneration 
systems have to be criticized for being possibly as adverse to sustainable, long term value-oriented corporate 
management as e.g. inadequate underlying performance measures. This imposes a severe restriction on the 
otherwise positive picture of the developments which materialized throughout the investigation period. 
An in-depth analysis of considered companies doesn’t lead to a clear picture concerning the factors that 
may explain the differing reporting and compliance behavior. Amongst several factors that have been tested 
(branch of business; size measured by total revenues; size measured by market capitalization; shares under 
state ownership; free float shares), only market capitalization seems to have a notable impact: smaller 
companies thus seem less likely to comply than bigger ones. Reasons for this behavior might be found e.g. in 
higher public exposure of (and thus pressure on) bigger companies. However, as market values of companies 
are also itself positively affected by reporting policies (see above), it is difficult to establish a clear cause-
effect-relationship. Consequently, an expanded sample of Austrian listed companies seems necessary in order 
to further explore this issue. 
Reasons for the deficits in the companies’ reporting behavior might be found especially on a cultural basis: 
in German-speaking countries, disclosure of information on remuneration is considered very sensitive and 
heavily discussed in literature, looking back on a long tradition of discretion in that matter. This doesn’t 
necessarily imply that the under-lying remuneration systems themselves are faulted. But still, from a 
shareholder perspective this situation is problematic for reasons already discussed. 
4. Conclusion 
Our analysis of remuneration systems for members of the management board of ATX-listed companies 
shows a heterogeneous picture, both concerning actual design and disclosure. Basically the examined 
companies take advantage of ambiguous regulations and alternatives of compliance with these regulations in 
their annual reports. That makes comparisons difficult and reduces informational value. Nevertheless, some 
commonalities and clear trends can be outlined in the following paragraphs.  
 
 
g. Strabag SE, annual report 2010, p. 61. 
h. E.g. conwert Immobilien Invest SE, annual report 2010, p. 163: “Up to 50% of the performance-based component will be paid out 
when the weighted average share price based on volume increases by more than 10% during the year. An additional payment of up 
to 50% of the performance-based component will be paid out when earnings per share rise by 10% during the financial year”.  
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1. Despite several advantages corporations do not fully comply with the regulations of the OeCGK on 
remuneration systems of the management board. Through-out the analyzed period several corporations 
deviate from so called C-rules. This is in accordance with the regulations of the OeCGK as long as the 
corporations give a sufficient explanation. In many cases, the information given in the annual reports 
(including the corporate governance statements) is however only of little informational value for 
shareholders and thus does not fulfill its function to reduce information asymmetry. In other cases 
corporations even do not give any explanation at all for the reasons of their non-compliance. 
However in the case of regulation C-31, time-series comparison shows that the reclassification of the 
regulation from category “R” to category “C” led to considerable improvements in the corporations’ 
reporting behavior. At the end of the financial year 2010, the majority of ATX-listed companies 
complies with this regulation. We assume from this that although both categories state de facto non-
mandatory disclosure requirements, corporations attribute considerable negative signaling effects to 
exercising “explain”-options. We conclude that in spite of our initial findings C-rules contribute to the 
quality of corporate governance regulations.  
2. Despite the fact that not all remuneration systems are compliant to the relevant C-rules and thus 
transparent for our further inquiries, as far as the reported systems are concerned the concrete design 
of employed remuneration systems of the management board is consistent with the requirements as 
stated in the OeCGK. This is especially true for the relevance of variable components and adequate 
limitations for these components in remuneration system designs. Whereas for the choice of 
performance measures which form the assessment bases for variable components, the picture we get is 
more ambiguous. These measures are primarily based upon figures from financial reporting, whereas 
value-based figures are of considerable less importance. Theoretically speaking, this is in accordance 
with the requirements of the OeCGK which does not express more concrete criteria for the choice of 
these performance measures. But still we doubt that the application of these financial reporting figures 
is also in accordance with the requirements for principles of sustainable, long-term and multi-year 
performance criteria as additionally required by the OeCGK since the revision in the year 2010. 
Consequently it seems desirable to promote the use of value-based performance measures in 
remuneration systems or to modify these systems to include at least key elements of these measures 
(e.g. multi-year reference periods). However further information given in several of the examined 
annual reports hints at an increased awareness of this problem by these corporations. Accordingly it 
can be assumed that an adaption of the employed remuneration systems will take place within the next 
reporting periods. 
3. Based on the findings mentioned above, time-series-analysis leads to the following conclusion: The 
introduction and improvement of the relevant regulations of the OeCGK seem to have induced a 
change both in the quality and extent of reporting on the employed remuneration systems by the 
companies as well as in the functional design of these remuneration systems. This conclusion is based 
on the prevailing reporting on C-rules by the analyzed corporations which leads to a considerable 
increase in scope of disclosure throughout the investigation period. Furthermore the disclosures 
concerning the design of remuneration systems show that these are mainly in accordance with the 
requirements of the OeCGK. Finally changes in the requirements of the OeCGK concerning this 
design are also reflected in changes of the remuneration systems employed by the analyzed 
companies. 
However we find deficits regarding a certain level of ambiguity of the regulations contained in the OeCGK 
which so far did not promote performance measures that are in accordance with the state-of-the-art laid out in 
literature. Thus we find the most important contribution of these regulations of the OeCGK on the design of 
remuneration systems in the increased employment of non-financial performance measures so far. The 
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institutionalization of value-based performance measures that align management’s remuneration to long time 
value-creation for shareholders is still a challenge to be tackled. For this reason, we conclude that throughout 
the investigation period the OeCGK succeeded far better in the improvement of reporting information 
available for shareholders than in the improvement of employed remuneration systems themselves. 
In spite of these deficits of the OeCGK its principles are functional for management control systems. 
Consequently further improvement of existing or addition of new C-rules to the OeCGK should also imply 
further improvement of reporting information available and of the employed remuneration systems, if they 
focus on regulations in accordance with the requirements of this functionality. In turn these factors contribute 
to a reduction of the principal-agent-problem. So, the OeCGK works as an important tool for ensuring 
shareholders’ interests and might do so even better given further improvements as discussed above. 
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